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ABSTRACT: This paper reports an analysis of 519 studies describing the impacts of NPM-
type reforms across Europe. The aim was to establish whether performance-oriented reforms 
had led to changes in outputs and/or outcomes. This was thus a test of a central proposition in 
NPM theory. A number of significant conceptual and methodological problems were 
immediately apparent, and we describe our route through them.  In conclusion, one principal 
finding is that although the population of studies is large, the number of high quality studies 
that focus on outputs is quite modest and the set addressing outcomes is very small. Another 
finding is that the identified impacts are distinctly ‘mixed’, with substantial proportions of 
studies indicating that specified outputs or outcomes are unchanged or ‘down’. Significantly, 
the database examines contextual influences which facilitate (or hinder) NPM reforms. 
Despite enormous attention, our understanding of the impacts of NPM remains both 
fragmentary and fragile. 
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The New Public Management (NPM) has spawned a huge and international academic 
literature.  Many commentators have attempted summaries or overviews (for example 
Barzelay, 2000; Christensen & Lægreid, 2011; Hood & Peters, 2004; Lane, 2000; Pollitt, 
2003) and it might therefore be thought that there was little left to say on the subject.  For at 
least three reasons, however, we argue that there is room for more.  First, we focus here on 
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what differences have performance-oriented management reforms made to outputs and 
outcomes – whereas many of the overviews and other studies are (perfectly legitimately) 
focused on defining NPM and discussing how it has spread and evolved on largely internal 
organizational changes of process and structure. Yet most definitions of NPM make it clear 
that performance improvements are at the heart of this kind of reform (Aristigueta & Van 
Dooren, 2007). Therefore we ask what is known of shifts in the relevant performances. 
Second, we take Europe as our domain. On the one hand this is a very wide canvas, but on 
the other it has until recently represented something of a terra incognita in NPM studies. The 
main weight of scholarship has usually fallen on those states considered to be the originators 
and most vigorous proponents of the brand – the Anglophone states of Australia, New 
Zealand, the UK and the US (see for example Lynn, 2006; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Here 
we survey the whole of Europe, west, central and eastern. Third, as described later, we have 
assembled a large-scale, multi-lingual database and subjected each individual study to 
considerable analysis as to scope, methods and findings.   
The layout of the paper is straightforward. We first set out what we mean by ’NPM’ 
and by ‘impacts’. Second, we take the reader through the processes by which we have 
selected and categorized the studies in our database. Third, we go on to review the substance 
of our findings.  
 
Theoretical background 
Our main purpose is to seek to answer an apparently straightforward empirical question: 
‘what have been the impacts of NPM reforms across Europe?’ To address the question we 
have assembled a large database of studies and we look across this database to try to see the 
‘big picture’. The studies in the database adopt a wide range of theoretical perspectives (and 
some of the official reports try as hard as they can to avoid ‘theory’ altogether). We have 
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refrained from trying to impose some master theory or meta-theory on top of all this variety – 
we simply seek to report it. Yet we cannot, of course, avoid theory that easily. 
The ‘practitioner theory’ behind NPM may not be either entirely homogenous or 
entirely coherent, but it does posit performance improvement as a central result of NPM-type 
reforms. There are several strands to this. First, efficiency will result from the additional 
authority given to professional managers. Second, it will also be enhanced by the use of 
market-type mechanisms such as contracting out, performance league tables, and 
performance–related pay. Third, in so far as service users can be given choice, they will 
exercise this in favor of those providers who offer a better service. Thus, with NPM, services 
will become both more efficient and more responsive to service users.  
To assess the degree to which these claims have been born out in practice we must 
look at changes not merely in processes and structures (important though these may be) but 
also in outputs and outcomes.  Efficiency is most commonly defined as the ratio between 
inputs and outputs, and therefore its assessment must involve some measurement of outputs 
(mere input reductions score as increased economy, but not necessarily increased efficiency).  
Services which are more responsive to users and give them greater satisfaction are achieving 
higher outcomes. These definitional issues can be both complex and (at times) fraught, but we 
believe we are here applying widely accepted versions of the relevant concepts. Therefore we 
are using the database to test an important part of a major body of practitioner theory. 
In assembling the database we sought to identify any significant contextual factors that 
have influenced outputs and/or outcomes. This reflects our broad sympathy for a ‘critical 
realist’ approach: 
‘Context, we have gradually learnt, is not unwelcome noise, not a confounding variable 
to be controlled for – but an integral part of a programme’ (Pawson, 2013, p. 36) 
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To put it simply, we assume it is the combination of the intervention (NPM policy or 
technique) and context which give rise to specific impacts. So a given technique may produce 
quite different outputs and outcomes in different circumstances. Contexts consist of complex 
assemblies of different elements, including organizational cultures, structures and procedures, 
legal frameworks and the political climate (Pawson, 2013).  
Defining NPM 
Defining NPM is the first step but it is not easy. In its origins NPM is strongly associated 
with UK Prime Minister Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan, and with the New 
Zealand Labor governments of 1984-1990. Neither Mrs. Thatcher nor Ronald Reagan were 
any friends of the ‘planning’ approach which had been the orthodoxy in the US and UK 
public sectors of the 1960s and early 1970s. During their periods in power in the 1980s they, 
and many of their advisers, favored what they considered to be a more ‘business-like’ 
approach. Gradually, partly through doctrine and partly through trial and error, this general 
attitude crystallized into a more specific set of recipes for public sector reform. By the early 
1990s a number of influential commentators appeared to believe that there was one clear 
direction – at least in the Anglophone world. This general direction was soon labeled as the 
New Public Management (NPM) or (in the US) Re-inventing Government (a seminal article 
here was Hood, 1991). A pair of American management consultants, who wrote a best-seller 
entitled Reinventing government and then became advisers to the US Vice President on a 
major reform program, was convinced that the changes they saw were part of a global trend. 
They claimed that ‘entrepreneurial government’ (as they called it) was both worldwide and 
‘inevitable’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).   
There have been many definitional disputes and ambiguities about exactly what the 
key elements of this widespread trend were supposed to be (Dunleavy & colleagues, 2006; 
Gow & Dufour, 2000; Hood, 1990; Hood & Peters, 2004). For our purpose we will assume 
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(like Dunleavy and colleagues) that the NPM is a two-level phenomenon. At the higher level 
it is a general theory or doctrine that the public sector can be improved by the importation of 
business concepts, techniques and values (Gore, 1997, Lord President of the Council, 1981). 
Such a large-scale importation, it should be noted, is not merely a technical operation, 
because it ultimately has implications for the role and size of the state itself. Then, second, at 
the more mundane level, NPM is a bundle of specific concepts and practices, particularly 
including: 
 Greater emphasis on ‘performance’, especially through the measurement of outputs.  
Here we should immediately note that, while performance-oriented reforms are 
central to NPM, they are not exclusive to NPM (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). In this 
paper, however, we focus only on reforms that are seen by commentators in the 
countries concerned as being distinctly NPM-ish in character 
 A preference for lean, flat, small, specialized (disaggregated) organizational forms 
over large, multi-functional forms (for instance semi-autonomous executive agencies 
– see for example Pollitt & colleagues, 2004) 
 A widespread substitution of contracts for hierarchical relations as the principal 
coordinating device 
 A widespread injection of market-type mechanisms (MTMs) including competitive 
tendering, public sector league tables, performance-related pay and various user-
choice mechanisms 
 An emphasis on treating service users as ‘customers’ and on the application of generic 
quality improvement techniques such as TQM. 
Dunleavy & colleagues (2006, p. 470) have usefully summarized this as ‘disaggregation + 
competition + incentivization’.   
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It would be mistaken to assume that this formula was internally consistent (Hood, 
1995). There is some tension between different intellectual streams that feed into the NPM, 
particularly between the economistic, principal-and-agent way of thinking, which is 
essentially low trust, and the more generic managerial way of thinking which is more 
concerned with leadership and innovation – and more trusting of the inherent creativity of 
staff, if only they are properly led and motivated (Pollitt, 2003). The former stream 
emphasizes the construction of rational systems of incentives and penalties to ‘make the 
managers manage’. The latter emphasizes the need to ‘let the managers manage’ by 
facilitating creative leadership, entrepreneurship and cultural change. Other writers have 
drawn a parallel distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ versions of NPM (Ferlie & Geraghty, 
2005).  
 
Defining and assessing impacts 
We have distinguished between impacts on activities/processes, outputs and outcomes. 
Within these broad categories we have paid particular attention to impacts on efficiency, 
effectiveness, and the attitudes of those who use public services. ‘Impacts’ are things that can 
reasonably be supposed to have been caused by the reforms. In thinking about impacts we 
adopted a fairly standard model of policymaking (Figure 1). 
 
Place Figure 1 here 
 
An organization or program is conceived as a set of activities or processes. These 
would include organizational arrangements like the division of responsibility, the allocation 
of authority, the standard operating procedures, and so on. These procedures enable the 
organization to deploy and redeploy its resources which are collectively termed inputs. From 
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these activities and processes the organization or program then produces a set of outputs. 
These outputs are, in a sense, what the organization ‘gives’ to the outside world – to citizens, 
to civil society associations and to business firms. They are like messages, passing across the 
membrane that separates (on the one hand) the state from (on the other) the market sector and 
civil society. Outputs are invariably intended to produce desirable outcomes. An outcome is 
something that happens in the world outside the organization and the program: it is an effect 
‘out there in the real world’. Some analysts make distinctions between ‘intermediate 
outcomes’ and ‘final outcomes’, but we decided that such a distinction, though useful in some 
contexts, would be of limited value in our field of study, where outcomes measures of any 
kind turn out to be rather rare. 
There is also the vexed issue of attribution which needs to be discussed upfront. To be 
an impact the particular outcome or output must appear, prima facie, to be the result of that 
reform, not of other developments which may be happening at the same time. There must be 
a plausible causality. This condition is, however, often hard to satisfy (in the studies we have 
examined frequently it is not satisfied at all). A classic example would be shifts in public 
satisfaction, or trust, in government or in the civil service. If there is a shift (either upwards or 
downwards) it could be the result of a preceding public service reform. However, it could 
also be the result of a general well-being factor, linked to an economic boom, or to ephemeral 
shifts in party politics (a new leader, a scandal) or to pre-existing personal expectations or 
hopes, or any combination of these.  
All in all, it can be readily appreciated that assessing the impacts of NPM reforms is 
far from straightforward. It involves several layers of categorization and interpretation, each 
of which has some effect on what is eventually ‘found’.  More generally, it is important to 
understand that the body of work contained within the database derives from a mixed, 
increasingly multinational community, consisting of academics, public servants, management 
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consultants and politicians. Their reasons for becoming engaged with NPM reforms have 
differed. This mixture of motives means that the dividing line between descriptive and 
analytical (‘is’) statements and normative (‘ought’) statements is frequently hard to find. The 
desire to understand and explain is often tangled up with the desire to promote and support a 
particular kind of reform. Our raw materials (studies) are neither pure nor homogenous. 
Despite the large N this points towards an interpretive literature review with some simple 
counting. More advanced statistical techniques would not be appropriate for such 
heterogeneity. 
The domain covered by the database
i
 
For practical reasons of research capacity we decided not to try to pursue every NPM reform 
in every European country at every level. We limited our search in various ways. We 
excluded acts of outright privatization (privatization is here defined as the sale of publically-
owned assets to the private sector).   
We concentrated on central governments. We have not attempted to cover reforms of sub-
national tiers of government per se, although we have included quite a few centrally-inspired 
initiatives which have impacted significantly on sub-national and local tiers.  Some of these 
have been on a large scale (for example Audit Commission, 2009). We covered the literature 
from all EU member states (except Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia) plus Croatia, 
Norway and Switzerland. In all we took in studies from 26 states and the European 
Commission. 
The selection of studies and construction of the database 
The process of selecting studies for inclusion was a complex one, and provided us with a 
forcible introduction to the problems of defining and identifying reform impacts. In order to 
get the pan-European coverage and linguistic diversity we were seeking we worked with 
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partners in ten other universities in nine other countries apart from our own. Together with 
these partners we went through six main steps: 
 We discussed, in meetings and by correspondence, what we meant by NPM 
(arriving at the position outlined above) 
 We discussed, in meetings and by correspondence, what we meant by impacts 
(arriving at the position outlined above). Neither of these first two steps was 
entirely straightforward, as they revealed quite a wide diversity of initial 
definition and usage. 
 We then asked all partners to identify key texts (whether academic or 
practitioner) which assessed NPM impacts, both from their own country and 
from neighboring countries  
 Once the texts were identified we asked partners to submit them to an electronic 
database. At this point they were also required to fill in a form (for each 
document) in which they were asked to classify the document and make various 
assessments of it.  For example, did the document say outcomes or outputs or 
processes had improved, stayed the same or deteriorated?  Did it mention 
significant contextual influences and, if so, what were they?  We termed the 
answers to these questions ‘metadata’ and they were lodged in the database, 
linked to the actual document or study 
 In addition to the documents identified and submitted by our partner universities 
we conducted a literature review of our own, and subsequently added further 
documents which we found, together with their associated metadata. This 
literature review is described in the Appendix 
 As a further check for consistency the two authors of this paper read through a 
large sample (more than 150) of the database entries to check whether we 
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agreed with the classifications used by our partners. We also checked a smaller 
number (circa 30) of studies coded by each other, to assure ourselves that our 
own assessments were identical. In these two ways we attempted to ensure that 
inter-coder reliability was adequate 
 We did not insist on one particular method or set of methods in the studies. To 
have done so would have radically reduced the total number of studies, and 
therefore undermined our wish to establish what the big picture of current 
(published) knowledge is. 
 
In sum, we have taken a relatively relaxed approach to the process of admitting 
documents to the database, but a puritanical approach to analyzing what it finally contains 
(especially in the classification of outputs and outcomes). Our puritanism, if that is what it is, 
stems from a desire to achieve a measure of consistency across a large number of very 
diverse documents, together with our determination to focus, as far as we are able, on the 
outputs and outcomes that matter to the world outside public sector organizations. The 
question, to put it crudely, is ‘what do we get for all this reorganization?’ where ‘we’ are the 
citizenry and its representatives, civil society associations and companies. In all the 
multifarious literature on NPM this question has not been asked often enough, and has rarely 
been asked on the empirical scale that is performed here. 
Most of the studies in the database (68 percent) are academic while the rest include 
official policy reports, external and internal evaluations or studies by international 
organizations. Large-N studies make up circa 22 percent of the total database. Small-N makes 
up circa 36 percent while the rest are analytical overviews and declarative studies without a 
precise identification of the number of cases. The definition of small and large N that we 
adopted did not follow a specific threshold, but rather it reflected the distinction between 
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qualitative case study approaches (small N) versus quantitative research (large N). While the 
generous treatment of evidence of impacts can be considered a limitation, it was in line with 
our goal of seeking the overall picture of the NPM literature across Europe. A few other 
scholars have focused on studies that employ particular quantitative methods, but inevitably 
they have ended up with much smaller populations of studies (for example Andrews, 2011) 
which are not representative of the overall character of the NPM literature.  
It is plain that the UK (nearly 20 percent), France (13.8 percent), Germany (12.4 
percent), the Netherlands (also 12.4 percent) and Italy (11.7 percent) heavily outnumber the 
numbers of studies from other countries (see Table 1 in the Appendix). Four of these ‘big 
hitters’ are also countries with the largest populations, but the Netherlands seems to punch 
above its demographic weight, possibly because it has a proportionately large population of 
public administration scholars and a tradition of academic involvement in public 
policymaking. 
 
Findings 
One first finding is that most of the studies have not gone beyond reporting changes (or no 
change) in processes or activities. Studies of outputs are less common than studies of 
processes. As for outcomes, we found that only 45 studies in the total database (less than 9 
percent) have gone that far (see Table 2 in the Appendix). Table 3 in the Appendix 
synthesizes our findings concerning the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of such reforms. Outcomes and 
outputs, not just processes and activities, are found to have improved more often than not. 
One should note, however, that this broadly favorable picture is hardly uniform. Table 3 
indicates that many studies report negative changes in outcomes, outputs or processes. 
Furthermore, a sizable number of studies and entries have not reported significant changes, or 
have reported no changes at all.  
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NPM-type reforms do not seem to be always successful. On the upside, outcomes, 
outputs and processes/activities are all reported as improving things more often than they 
make them worse.  On the other hand, one could argue that the glass is only half full, 
because, if one adds together the categories of ‘no change’ and ‘things got worse’, one finds 
that in 56 percent of the studies where outcomes were reported, they did not get better, and in 
47 percent of the studies where outputs were recorded they also failed to improve. This 
makes NPM reform look like a pretty hit-and-miss affair.   
We should immediately note some limitations on the interpretation of these findings.  
First, we have bundled bigger and smaller changes together. Some studies cover single cases 
while others cover whole programs of reform. Second, improvements in one aspect may be 
balanced out by deteriorations in another. Thus, to say that the majority of those studies 
which focus on outputs and outcomes record improvements does not mean that there may not 
also be deteriorations in other areas recorded in some of those studies. Management reforms 
present complex trade-offs which (willingly or unwillingly) are often not acknowledged and 
assessed. The following examples of output and/or outcome studies from the database 
illustrate this. Andersen (2008) studied the impact of performance-oriented reform on 
performance, quality and inequality in Danish public schools. The results suggested that 
performance, measured by average exam scores, did not change significantly, quality 
improved slightly while the measure of inequality worsened. Jeannot & Guillemot (2010) 
conducted a quantitative analysis of performance management tools in French central 
government and deconcentrated services. They found no impact on outcomes, firm 
improvements in internal processes and lower staff morale. Clear improvements in processes 
came at the expense of lower staff satisfaction.  
Many of our studies refer to important contextual factors which, they argue, facilitated 
or (more usually) inhibited or distorted performance-oriented reform attempts. Analysis of 
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the database suggests that these contextual factors may provide one of the main explanations 
for why a given reform may be more successful in one country or sector than in another. 
To analyze contextual factors we developed an analytical framework. We proceeded 
inductively by following the following steps:  
1. We read systematically through all the studies in the database which identified 
specific changes in outputs or outcomes 
2. We noted wherever one of these studies mentioned a contextual factor as having been 
an important influence, and listed what those factors were 
3. We inspected the list and built from it a set of categories that are appropriate to our 
specific topic – the impacts of performance reforms. 
Three important features emerged. First, one can conceptualize a range from deep-seated, 
long-lasting influences at one pole towards medium term and then short term influences at the 
other. On the whole reformers should be able to foresee and anticipate many of the longer 
lasting influences (for example those introducing reforms in the CEE countries in the 1990s 
should have recognized that they were starting with a civil service that was weak on many 
skills, often corrupt and not at all ‘consumer focused’ – and they should therefore have 
included plans for dealing with these features). But the closer one comes to the other pole – 
sudden events and chance happenings – the more difficult it will usually be for reformers to 
plan or allow for them (for example reforms may be blown off course by the discovery of a 
major scandal, or the occurrence of a major accident or natural disaster just after the reform 
has been announced). There is a complication here which needs to be noted.  Time runs in 
both directions.  Some sudden, surprise events can have long term consequences in the future 
(9/11 being an outstanding example). Other contextual factors may have existed for a long 
time but have only a minor influence in the future. On the whole, however, features of 
political systems and public organizations which have existed for a long time – cultures, basic 
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structures, embedded standing operating procedures – are likely to be resistant to being 
changed overnight. In short, it is highly probable that long-standing, basic features of the 
machine will require sustained efforts over months or years before they can be removed or 
radically modified. 
Second, different contextual effects are not equally broad in their effects. Thus the 
civil service culture may be expected to exert an influence right across government. Equally 
the effects of a centralized, powerful executive are likely to be widely spread. However not 
all contextual influences are on this scale. Some may be local, yet nevertheless durable and 
strong. For example, it may be that a particular town or a particularly prestigious organization 
has a different culture from the others and insists on ‘doing things differently’ (for example 
the case of the capital, Tallinn, in the primary health care reforms in Estonia – see Atun & 
colleagues, 2005). Or there may be a local incident or controversy, such as that concerning 
the shooting incident which led to the premature departure of a reforming English police 
chief, as cited in Pollitt & Bouckaert (2009).  
The third important feature is that contextual influences can help or hinder reforms.  
Indeed, the politico-administrative culture, for example, may hinder one type of reform but 
help another. A political system with a powerful centralized executive may help that country 
quickly to implement a radical reform that improves, say, tax collection services, but on 
another occasion the same structural features may encourage governments to over-reform – to 
go on and on changing things just because they are easy to change, until confusion and 
cynicism begin to grow. Thus, although contextual factors most frequently gain attention 
when they hinder reforms, they can also facilitate implementation. For example, the socio-
economic status of the local catchment area tends strongly to affect the exam results achieved 
by a school (Wilson & Piebalga, 2008). What kind of local contextual influence has, say, a 
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deprived socio-economic catchment on a national reform designed to improve exam 
performance?  On the basis of our analytical framework it is:  
 Local in scale (because the socio-economic composition may be quite different a 
kilometre or two away) 
 Medium to long term in time (the socio-economic composition of neighbourhoods can 
and do change over time, but that is usually a matter of years or decades rather than 
weeks or months – and it cannot be controlled by the school) 
 Inhibiting or distorting of reform (it does not stop the reform being implemented, but 
it probably reduces its effectiveness in comparison with a school that has a catchment 
in a locality with a high socio-economic character). 
To take another example, if we look at a study of the marketization of healthcare services in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Nemec & Kolisnichenko, 2006) we find that the (largely) 
disappointing achievements of reform were deeply affected by wider economic conditions at 
the time. 
‘probably the crucial objective issue in all countries was finance, which was tied to 
the level of economic performance of the country. Health reforms started to be 
realized in the period of more or less massive decline of GDP per capita in most CEE 
countries’ (Nemec & Kolisnichenko, 2006, p. 24). 
In terms of the framework this would be: 
 International in scale (it affected the whole CEE region) 
 Somewhere between ‘quite sudden’ and ‘medium term’ in time (the decline in GDP 
per capita began quite suddenly but lasted for a few years – reformers could hardly 
have claimed to be unaware of it) 
 Inhibiting or distorting of reform (the reforms went ahead but did not work out nearly 
as positively as had been proclaimed).  
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Table 4 in the Appendix categorizes and synthesizes contextual factors using the analytical 
framework that we introduced previously along with specific examples of studies in each 
category (for a more elaborate recent treatment of context see Pollitt & Dan, 2011).  
Implications for practice and further research 
What implications for practice and future research can be drawn from our findings? First, 
reformers would be well-advised to include in their reform teams members with up-to-date 
local knowledge, both formal and tacit. Such individuals should be best placed to anticipate 
problems with the local culture, standard operating procedures, staff morale or tendencies to 
corruption.  Reform teams composed entirely or primarily of consultants or reform 
enthusiasts from outside the target organizations or programs are inherently risky.  
A second implication is that an ex ante systematic review of likely contextual factors 
constitutes a highly desirable feature of any reform plan. This analysis can identify rough 
areas as well as windows of opportunity which can facilitate successful implementation – or 
help avoid common mistakes – and ultimately the impacts of reform. In this sense our 
database can provide a check list of possible items to think about. These include: 
 Considering the implications of the wider political system. The overall political 
system (broad scope) does not usually change much in the short term:  reforms may 
therefore need adapting according to whether they are being inserted to, say, an 
aggressively competitive, majoritarian system or a more consensually-oriented multi-
party system 
 Assessing the likelihood of sudden turnovers of governments and/or restructurings of 
governmental structures and functions. Such volatilities may exercise a major 
influence on the continuity and cohesion of reform efforts in time and across 
governmental levels and units. This factor is more difficult to predict as it may be due 
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to unanticipated accidents, crises or scandals. However, in the case of some countries 
(Italy in the 1980s and 1990s, some CEE countries since the mid-1990s) rapid 
changes of government are a clear and expected pattern 
 Assessing the local organizational culture. This is a longer term influence, hard to 
change radically in the short term but potentially malleable in the medium to long 
term 
 Recognizing the degree of corruption existing in the particular sector/organization.  
Many NPM reforms are hard to implement in a high-corruption environment because 
they involve giving managers and front-line staff greater autonomy – in cases where 
corruption is prevalent it may be necessary to tackle corruption, at least in selected 
areas or sectors, before NPM reforms can be fully implemented. Corruption is one 
particular aspect of culture, and is similarly hard to transform in the short term, 
although it can be progressively reduced over time 
 Assessing the existing capacity and skill set of the organization(s) which are to 
undergo reform. Skill sets can be altered in the medium term if a planned program of 
training and recruitment is put in place. In the short term there is little point 
introducing a new technique (such as regular appraisal interviews; accruals 
accounting) if enough staff are not trained to operate them 
 Analyzing the socio-demographic situation of users and citizens that are targeted by 
reform, since different groups may experience the effects of reform differently and, 
conversely, the impacts of reform may be different, based on different socio-
demographic characteristics 
 Considering the role and influence of more ’organized’ factors affecting 
implementation and possibly impacts per se, such as labor unions or (senior) civil 
servants who are opposed to reform and can possibly exert significant influence. 
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A third implication is clearly that those researching public management reform need to be 
particularly careful to specify the domain over which they consider their findings are likely to 
hold reasonably true, and to identify the main contextual influences they see as being in play 
within that domain. Too many of the documents in our database are loose or even silent about 
these issues of domain and context. Only by being more specific about these issues (and, 
indeed, by actively theorizing them) can it be hoped that sound, contextually grounded, 
middle level generalizations will emerge (Pawson, 2013).  
Finally, we should acknowledge a number of weaknesses in our own study. Our 
strategy has been to seek the ‘big picture’ of European scholarship and official analyses on 
NPM impacts. Our picture is a picture of what the literature says, and one cannot guarantee 
that it has a very close relationship to some underlying ‘reality’.  We have allowed many 
different kinds of studies into the database, so we cannot claim any kind of methodological 
homogeneity. The impact attribution claims in different studies vary widely in nature (some 
seeming quite weak). We cannot go beyond the crude figures reported in Tables 2 and 3 in 
the Appendix to seek any kind of statistical average, mean or distribution. We have no way of 
measuring the relative sizes of effects (increases, decreases etc.) or whether they are 
statistically significant.  Furthermore there may be some double-counting, in the sense that 
we may have included in the database more than one study of the same reform (though where 
we have, the different studies usually adopt different approaches and methods). On the other 
hand, we may have left some important studies out, because of our prime focus on central 
government. In a number of European countries (for example Germany, Italy) the main 
weight of performance-oriented management reform has fallen on sub national 
administrations. We have picked up a few of these studies (where the reform has been 
initiated by central government) but there are others we have not caught in our net. Nor have 
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we been able to ask more subtle questions such as ‘for whom, exactly was such-and-such a 
reform a “success”?’ or ‘what constitutes success for each participant?’ All these limitations, 
of course, represent opportunities for future research. 
Concluding observations 
What, finally, can we say about the impacts of central government-initiated performance 
reform in Europe? On the one hand there have been endless publications – academic and 
official – concerned with NPM-like programs and techniques. Yet, on the other, our solid, 
scientific knowledge of the general outcomes of all this thinking and activity is very limited. 
Even our somewhat larger understanding of outputs cannot be described as more than 
fragmentary. Claims and counterclaims outnumber hard, carefully collected evidence by a 
substantial margin. That was noted in the mid-1990s (Pollitt, 1995) and again by other 
scholars in the 21st century (Andrews, 2011; Hood, 2005; Hood & Dixon, 2012; see also 
Modell & Grӧ nlund, 2007; Norman, 2007), and it remains the case today. The impacts of 
NPM are elusive, both definitionally and empirically. 
It is true that our database holds a good deal of interesting information about changes 
in outputs resulting from performance-oriented reform, but what the collectivity of this 
knowledge suggests is that these vary enormously, from highly positive through ’no change’ 
to rather negative, depending on circumstances. One broad conclusion is that it is often 
inappropriate to talk in general of a particular tool or technique ’working’ or ’not working’. 
Similarly the notion of an abstracted, internationally mobile ’best practice’ begins to appear 
rather fragile (this point has already been noted by a number of scholars and organizations – 
see, in the rather different context of development administration, World Bank, 2012). Both 
species of generalization fail to take sufficient account of the sheer variety and power of 
contextual influences. To put it another way, all sorts of contextual ’conditions’ have to be 
satisfied for a given performance-oriented tool to work well – or perhaps at all.  
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All this has implications for theory. In order to explain the impacts of performance 
reform, one needs a theory which grants contextual factors an explicit and substantial role 
and which, within that recognizes the importance of cultural and institutional factors. That, in 
turn, suggests that the simpler versions of rational choice theory (one of the pillars of early 
NPM thinking) are a problematic vehicle for this kind of explanation. Although more 
sophisticated versions of the theory can model varying contexts (Dunleavy, 1991), the typical 
applications in the public management literature have said little of contextual variation, and 
little about the vast range of cultures or institutional structures (Lane, 2000; Niskanen, 1973). 
They have focused mainly on individual motivations and relationships, or contractual 
relations which treat the contracting organizations as if they were homogenous actors – an 
inadequate basis for understanding the actual effects of NPM, according to many of the 
studies reviewed here.  
Neither do generic management theories make many concessions to contextual 
variation – they are, by nature and intent, ’generic’ (Barzelay, 1992; Kettl, 2000). But 
inspection of our database makes it seem improbable that ’six steps’ or ’new transformational 
techniques’ models of management will prove reliable guides for public managers inhabiting 
different cultures, political systems, sectors, task environments and histories.  
More positively, the theoretical pre-requisites proposed in the previous paragraph can 
be satisfied.  There are several theoretical approaches that might meet the bill, including 
historical institutionalism (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2009), sociological institutionalism (Peters, 
2005), critical realism (Pawson & Tilley, 1997; Pawson, 2013) and some varieties of 
organization theory (Tsoukas & Knudsen, 2003). Each of these, however, will require some 
modification or further refinement. The ’new institutionalisms’, for example, sometimes fail 
to leave enough space for actors, leaders, accidents and ’situations’, whereas our database 
shows that these can sometimes be of great importance (an election, a new leader, a scandal). 
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The present paper has been mainly concerned with assessing the strength of pro-NPM 
practitioner theory, so this is not the place to begin a deep theoretical comparison, but suffice 
it to say that we do not lack theoretical tools capable of tackling the range of findings which 
our work has brought to the surface. 
Despite all these caveats, it would be mistaken to dismiss NPM as a failure. That 
would be just another sweeping generalization. While keeping in mind the limitations of our 
study, the database entries for outcomes show improvements in 44 percent of studies, for 
outputs the corresponding figure is 53 percent, and for processes/activities it is 58 percent. So 
NPM often does ’work’. Like a delicate plant, however, it seems to require the right soil and 
care – more the orchid than the potato. It is not robust across a wide range of environments. 
One ’message’ would therefore be that would-be reformers need to look rather hard at several 
dimensions of the local context before they decide that NPM is the answer to their problems 
(and certainly before they decide how to implement it).This is the key take-away message 
from our research. It is not new, but what is new is that in our case it is based on a systematic 
review of an unusually large body of literature across Europe. While essentially European, 
our research has brought to the surface implications that practitioners and researchers in 
countries other than European may find helpful to consider. In this sense our implications for 
practice and theory are broad enough to speak to the world rather than to Europe alone.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Literature search 
Each of the ten partner universities reviewed the literature in their own country and any other 
country they had agreed to cover. These reviews were the basis for their selections of suitable 
documents/studies to upload to the database.  In addition, we conducted a literature search in 
which we checked everything that had been published between 1980 and the middle of 2011 
in a number of the leading mainstream Anglophone public administration journals: 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
Public Administration 
Governance 
Public Administration Review  
International Review of Administrative Sciences 
International Public Management Journal 
Public Management Review 
Public Policy and Administration 
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Evaluation 
In addition to these academic sources we scrutinized a number of promising organizational 
publication lists, including those of: 
OECD 
SIGMA 
World Bank 
National government websites on central government reforms (in those countries 
where they are available) 
National audit office performance audits (in those countries where they are 
available) 
Certain civil society organizations in Central and Eastern Europe  
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Place Table 4 here 
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 The database of NPM reforms in Europe is available online at  
http://www.cocops.eu/work-packages/wp1-npm-meta-analysis/database-of-studies-of-npm-reforms-in-europe 
